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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
In this Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) appeal, Bayer 
Corporation and Bayer Healthcare contest the 
certification of a class of consumers who purchased 
Bayer‟s One-A-Day WeightSmart diet supplement in 
Florida. The sole issue on appeal is whether the class 
members are ascertainable. While this interlocutory 
appeal was pending, we decided Marcus v. BMW of 
North America, LLC, in which we held “[i]f class 
members are impossible to identify without extensive 
and individualized fact-finding or „mini-trials,‟ then a 
class action is inappropriate.” 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d 
Cir. 2012). We explained that if class members cannot 
be ascertained from a defendant‟s records, there must 
be “a reliable, administratively feasible alternative,” 
but we cautioned “against approving a method that 
would amount to no more than ascertaining by 
potential class members‟ say so.” Id. at 594. In light of 
Marcus, we will vacate the class certification order and 
remand. 
 
I. 
 Gabriel Carrera brings this class action against Bayer 
Corporation and Bayer Healthcare, LLC (“Bayer”), claiming 
that Bayer falsely and deceptively advertised its product One-
A-Day WeightSmart. WeightSmart was promoted as a 
multivitamin and dietary supplement that had metabolism-
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enhancing effects. The recommended daily dose was one 
tablet and prices ranged from about $8.99 for fifty tablets to 
about $16.99 for one hundred tablets. Bayer sold 
WeightSmart in retail stores, such as CVS, until January 
2007. Bayer did not sell it directly to consumers. Carrera 
alleges Bayer falsely claimed that WeightSmart enhanced 
metabolism by its inclusion of epigallocatechin gallate, a 
green tea extract. 
 
Carrera initially sought to certify a nationwide class 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) bringing a claim under the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, as Bayer‟s headquarters is 
in New Jersey. The court denied certification, concluding that 
New Jersey law did not apply to out-of-state customers. This 
order is not before us on appeal. 
 
 Carrera then moved to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class of 
Florida consumers under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 
Trade Practices Act. One of Bayer‟s challenges to 
certification, and the issue on this appeal, is whether the class 
members are ascertainable. In this case, there is no dispute 
that class members are unlikely to have documentary proof of 
purchase, such as packaging or receipts. And Bayer has no 
list of purchasers because, as noted, it did not sell 
WeightSmart directly to consumers.   
 
Carrera advanced two ways to ascertain the class: first, 
by retailer records of online sales and sales made with store 
loyalty or rewards cards; second, by affidavits of class 
members, attesting they purchased WeightSmart and stating 
the amount they purchased. Bayer challenged this latter 
method on the ground that memories of putative class 
members will be unreliable. Bayer argued that, in Carrera‟s 
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own deposition testimony, he failed to remember when he 
purchased WeightSmart and that he confused it with 
WeightSmart Advanced and other generic or similar products 
(none of which are part of this litigation). In response, Carrera 
produced a declaration of James Prutsman, who works for a 
company that verifies and processes class settlement claims, 
in which Prutsman stated there are ways to verify the types of 
affidavits at issue here and screen out fraudulent claims.  
 
The court certified the class, defined as all persons 
who purchased WeightSmart in Florida.
1
 It characterized the 
issue of ascertainability as one of manageability, stating  
“„speculative problems with case management‟” are 
insufficient to prevent class certification. Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 08-4716, 2011 WL 5878376, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 22, 2011) (quoting Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 
1241, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2004)). The court concluded Carrera 
had satisfied his burden, noting “that the claims involved will 
be relatively small and Plaintiff points to methods to verify 
claims.” Id. Bayer appealed. It contends Carrera has failed to 
demonstrate the class is ascertainable because there is no 
evidence that any retailer records show who purchased 
WeightSmart. Bayer also argues that the use of unverifiable 
affidavits to ascertain class members fails to comply with 
Rule 23 and violates its rights under the due process clause. 
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
                                              
1
 The class definition does not include a class period. Bayer 
sold WeightSmart from December 2003 through January 
2007. 
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1332(d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). “We review a class certification order 
for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district court‟s 
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 
312 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Whether an incorrect 
legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be reviewed 
de novo.” Id. (quotation omitted). 
 
III. 
In Marcus, we explained the concept of 
ascertainability at length for the first time. 687 F.3d at 592-
95. The claim in Marcus was that Bridgestone run-flat tires 
(“RFTs”) were defective because they were highly 
susceptible to flats; could only be replaced, not repaired; and 
were highly priced. Id. at 588. The district court certified a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class consisting of “any and all current and 
former owners and lessees of 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 
BMW vehicles equipped with run-flat tires manufactured by 
Bridgestone . . . and sold or leased in New Jersey whose Tires 
have gone flat and been replaced.” Id. at 590 (quotation and 
alterations omitted). The defendants appealed, and we vacated 
the order certifying the class. 
 
 Before turning to the explicit requirements of Rule 23 
in Marcus, we addressed two “preliminary matters”: first, 
whether the class was clearly defined, and second, “whether 
the class must be (and, if so, is in fact) objectively 
ascertainable.” Id. at 591. We concluded the class was not 
clearly defined. At the least, the definition of the class was 
broader than intended and did not define the claims, issues, or 
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defenses to be treated on a class-wide basis. Id. at 592. 
Accordingly, we remanded the case for clarification of the 
class definition. 
 
 We then addressed ascertainability. We began by 
stating, “[m]any courts and commentators have recognized 
that an essential prerequisite of a class action, at least with 
respect to actions under Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class must 
be currently and readily ascertainable based on objective 
criteria.” Id. at 592-93 (citing cases). “If class members are 
impossible to identify without extensive and individualized 
fact-finding or „mini-trials,‟ then a class action is 
inappropriate.” Id. at 593. We noted, “[s]ome courts have 
held that where nothing in company databases shows or could 
show whether individuals should be included in the proposed 
class, the class definition fails.” Id. (citing cases).  
 
 We then explained the  
ascertainability requirement serves several 
important objectives. First, it eliminates serious 
administrative burdens that are incongruous 
with the efficiencies expected in a class action 
by insisting on the easy identification of class 
members. Second, it protects absent class 
members by facilitating the best notice 
practicable under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 
23(b)(3) action. Third, it protects defendants by 
ensuring that those persons who will be bound 
by the final judgment are clearly identifiable. 
 
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).  
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 We set forth why the “proposed class action raise[d] 
serious ascertainability issues.” Id. Defendant BMW 
explained that it could not determine by its records which 
vehicles fit the definition of the class because it did not keep 
records of which cars got fitted with Bridgestone RFTs, 
because some customers may have changed tires (of which 
BWM had no record), and because BMW would not have 
known which customers experienced flat tires. Id. at 593-94. 
We stated that if plaintiff were to attempt to re-certify a class 
on remand, the court “must resolve the critical issue of 
whether the defendants‟ records can ascertain class members 
and, if not, whether there is a reliable, administratively 
feasible alternative.” Id. at 594. We cautioned “against 
approving a method that would amount to no more than 
ascertaining by potential class members‟ say so. For example, 
simply having potential class members submit affidavits that 
their Bridgestone RFTs have gone flat and been replaced may 
not be proper or just.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Forcing 
BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true absent persons‟ 
declarations that they are members of the class, without 
further indicia of reliability, would have serious due process 
implications.” Id.  
 
IV. 
A. 
“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively 
demonstrate his compliance with” Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). “Class 
certification is proper only „if the trial court is satisfied, after 
a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites‟ of Rule 23 are 
met.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 309 (quoting Gen. Tel. 
9 
 
Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “Frequently 
that „rigorous analysis‟ will entail some overlap with the 
merits of the plaintiff‟s underlying claim. That cannot be 
helped. „[T]he class determination generally involves 
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal 
issues comprising the plaintiff‟s cause of action.‟” Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. at 2551-52 (alteration in original) (quoting Falcon, 457 
U.S. at 160). “Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 
23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320.  
 
These same standards apply to the question of 
ascertainability. Class ascertainability is “an essential 
prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect to actions 
under Rule 23(b)(3).” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 592-93. “[T]here 
is „no reason to doubt‟” that the “rigorous analysis” 
requirement “„applies with equal force to all Rule 23 
requirements.‟” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 309 n.5 
(quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 
33 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, a plaintiff must show, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the class is “currently 
and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria,” 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593, and a trial court must undertake a 
rigorous analysis of the evidence to determine if the standard 
is met.  
 “A party‟s assurance to the court that it intends or 
plans to meet the requirements [of Rule 23] is insufficient.” 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318. A plaintiff may not 
merely propose a method of ascertaining a class without any 
evidentiary support that the method will be successful. “„A 
critical need‟” of the trial court at certification “„is to 
determine how the case will be tried,‟” id. at 319 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee‟s note, 2003 
10 
 
Amendments), including how the class is to be ascertained. 
 
B. 
Ascertainability mandates a rigorous approach at the 
outset because of the key roles it plays as part of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action lawsuit. First, at the commencement of a 
class action, ascertainability and a clear class definition allow 
potential class members to identify themselves for purposes 
of opting out of a class. Second, it ensures that a defendant‟s 
rights are protected by the class action mechanism. Third, it 
ensures that the parties can identify class members in a 
manner consistent with the efficiencies of a class action.  
 
“„[T]he class-action device saves the resources of both 
the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially 
affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an 
economical fashion under Rule 23.‟” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)). If a class cannot be ascertained in 
an economical and “administratively feasible” manner, 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594, significant benefits of a class action 
are lost. See id. at 593 (explaining ascertainability “eliminates 
serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the 
efficiencies expected in a class action” (quotation omitted)). 
Accordingly, a trial court should ensure that class members 
can be identified “without extensive and individualized fact-
finding or „mini-trials,‟” id., a determination which must be 
made at the class certification stage.  
 
In this case, the ascertainability question is whether 
each class member purchased WeightSmart in Florida. If this 
were an individual claim, a plaintiff would have to prove at 
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trial he purchased WeightSmart. A defendant in a class action 
has a due process right to raise individual challenges and 
defenses to claims, and a class action cannot be certified in a 
way that eviscerates this right or masks individual issues. See 
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231-32 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting a “fluid recovery” method of 
determining individual damages, in which aggregate damages 
would be based on estimates of the number of defrauded class 
members and their average loss), abrogated on other grounds 
by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 
(2008); see also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (rejecting a method 
of class certification in which a sample set of class members 
would be used to extrapolate average damages). A defendant 
has a similar, if not the same, due process right to challenge 
the proof used to demonstrate class membership as it does to 
challenge the elements of a plaintiff‟s claim. See Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 594 (“Forcing BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true 
absent persons‟ declarations that they are members of the 
class, without further indicia of reliability, would have serious 
due process implications.”). Ascertainability provides due 
process by requiring that a defendant be able to test the 
reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class 
membership.  
 
The method of determining whether someone is in the 
class must be “administratively feasible.” Id. A plaintiff does 
not satisfy the ascertainability requirement if individualized 
fact-finding or mini-trials will be required to prove class 
membership. Id. at 593. “Administrative feasibility means 
that identifying class members is a manageable process that 
does not require much, if any, individual factual inquiry.” 
William B. Rubenstein & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class 
Actions § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011); see also Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 
12 
 
F.R.D. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Class membership must be 
readily identifiable such that a court can determine who is in 
the class and bound by its ruling without engaging in 
numerous fact-intensive inquiries.”). 
 
The type of challenge to the reliability of evidence that 
is required will vary based on the nature of the evidence. For 
example, if Carrera produces retailer records that purport to 
list purchasers of WeightSmart, Bayer can challenge the 
reliability of those records, perhaps by deposing a corporate 
record-keeper.
2
 In sum, to satisfy ascertainability as it relates 
to proof of class membership, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
his purported method for ascertaining class members is 
reliable and administratively feasible, and permits a defendant 
to challenge the evidence used to prove class membership. 
 
V. 
 Carrera contends the class is ascertainable. He points 
to two types of evidence that can be used to determine who is 
a class member. First, he argues the class can use records 
from retailers, which purportedly track customers who make 
purchases online or who use loyalty cards. Second, he 
proposes using affidavits of class members attesting to their 
purchases of WeightSmart. We conclude that, based on the 
evidence produced below, neither method satisfies Carrera‟s 
burden to show the class is ascertainable. 
                                              
2
 Although some evidence used to satisfy ascertainability, 
such as corporate records, will actually identify class 
members at the certification stage, ascertainability only 
requires the plaintiff to show that class members can be 
identified. 
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A. 
Carrera argues he will be able to show class 
membership using retailer‟s records of sales made with 
loyalty cards, e.g., CVS ExtraCare cards,
3
 and records of 
online sales. Carrera points to a Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) settlement with CVS regarding the sale of a 
supplement that was falsely advertised as boosting immune 
systems. The supplement was sold only at CVS. The FTC 
stated in its press release regarding the settlement that 
“[p]urchasers will be identified through the CVS ExtraCare 
card program and sales on cvs.com.” A1089.  
 
 Bayer contends there is no evidence that any other 
retailer of WeightSmart has membership cards, that the FTC 
case is inapposite as it was a stipulated settlement in a non- 
Rule 23 context,
4
 in which some of the money paid might go 
to class members but did not have to,
 
and that it is speculative 
whether CVS or any other retailer‟s records will reveal 
customers who purchased WeightSmart.  
 
 The evidence put forth by Carrera is insufficient to 
show that retailer records in this case can be used to identify 
                                              
3
 ExtraCare cards are membership cards that offer customers 
discounts. A1091. 
4
 Settlement classes raise different certification issues than 
litigation classes. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 620 (1997). Accordingly, we question whether the 
FTC‟s proposals for identifying purchasers, made as part of a 
settlement (and a non-class action settlement at that), bear any 
relevance to the issue of ascertainability in this case.  
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class members. Depending on the facts of a case, retailer 
records may be a perfectly acceptable method of proving 
class membership. But there is no evidence that a single 
purchaser of WeightSmart could be identified using records 
of customer membership cards or records of online sales. 
There is no evidence that retailers even have records for the 
relevant period. The FTC‟s press release does not support a 
finding that these records can determine class membership on 
the facts of this case. Moreover, we have no evidence the 
FTC‟s method was successful.  
 
B. 
 Carrera also contends the class is ascertainable using 
affidavits of class members. He advances three arguments. 
First, due to the low value of the claims, class members will 
be unlikely to submit fraudulent affidavits. Second, because 
Bayer‟s total liability will not depend on the reliability of the 
affidavits, the ascertainability requirement should be relaxed. 
Finally, a screening method such as the one described in the 
Prutsman Declaration will ensure any unreliable affidavits are 
identified and disregarded. 
 
1. 
Because the claims are of low value, Carrera argues it 
is less likely someone would fabricate a claim. He concedes it 
is unlikely customers would have retained a receipt, but 
asserts this is irrelevant to possible falsification. He contrasts 
the claims at issue here to those in Marcus, which involved 
more money and more complicated issues of fact as to 
whether an individual was a class member. 
 
15 
 
This argument fails because it does not address a core 
concern of ascertainability: that a defendant must be able to 
challenge class membership. This is especially true where the 
named plaintiff‟s deposition testimony suggested that 
individuals will have difficulty accurately recalling their 
purchases of WeightSmart.
5
 Cf. In re Phenylpropanolamine 
(PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 618-19 (W.D. Wa. 
2003) (concluding affidavits could not be used to ascertain a 
class because the named plaintiffs had difficulty remembering 
the products they bought that contained PPA).  
 
2. 
 Carrera also argues ascertainability is less important in 
this case because Bayer‟s total liability will be determined at 
trial, and will not increase or decrease based on the affidavits 
submitted. As noted, this is an action under the Florida 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. 
Stat. § 501.201 et seq. “[A] consumer claim for damages 
under FDUTPA has three elements: (1) a deceptive act or 
unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.” 
Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006). There is no requirement of actual reliance on the 
deceptive act. See Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 635 F.3d 
1279, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Davis v. Powertel, 
Inc., 776 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). “[T]he 
question is not whether the plaintiff actually relied on the 
alleged deceptive trade practice, but whether the practice was 
                                              
5
 As mentioned, in his deposition testimony, Carrera was 
unable to remember when he purchased WeightSmart and 
confused WeightSmart with other products that are not part of 
this litigation. 
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likely to deceive a consumer acting reasonably in the same 
circumstances.” Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974. 
 
Contending liability under the FDUTPA is not based 
on individual issues, Carrera argues that he can prove at trial 
that Bayer owes a refund for every purchase of 
WeightSmart.
6
 Since Bayer‟s records show it sold 
approximately $14 million worth of WeightSmart in Florida, 
Carrera asserts Bayer‟s liability will be determined at trial to 
be $14 million—no more, no less. As a result, affidavits 
attesting to class membership will only be used to determine 
to whom to pay the refund, and in what amount. 
 
Under no circumstances, Carrera assures us, will Bayer 
pay any amount other than $14 million, even if a significant 
number of inaccurate claims are submitted and paid out. For 
example, if claims are made for more than $14 million, and 
inaccurate or false claims cannot be screened out, claimants 
will simply receive less than they are entitled to. And if too 
few claims are made, Carrera asserts the excess funds will not 
be returned to Bayer but will go to an unclaimed property 
fund. Carrera contrasts this situation with Marcus. In Marcus, 
there was no evidence of the total number of RFTs allegedly 
purchased in violation of the consumer protection laws. 
Accordingly, each claim submitted would have increased the 
amount of money the defendants would have had to pay. As a 
                                              
6
 Bayer argues that if it is liable, its liability will be limited to 
refunding the premium consumers paid for WeightSmart 
based on its metabolism-enhancing claims. For purposes of 
this appeal, it makes no difference whether customers would 
be entitled to a full refund or merely a refund of this 
premium.  
17 
 
result, the defendants had a more substantial interest in 
screening out false claims. Because Bayer‟s total liability 
cannot be so affected by unreliable affidavits, Carrera argues 
Bayer lacks an interest in challenging class membership. 
 
Under Carrera‟s view, if fraudulent or inaccurate 
claims are paid out, the only harm is to other class members. 
But ascertainability protects absent class members as well as 
defendants, Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593, so Carrera‟s focus on 
Bayer alone is misplaced. It is unfair to absent class members 
if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be 
diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims. In this case, as we 
discuss, there is the possibility that Carrera‟s proposed 
method for ascertaining the class via affidavits will dilute the 
recovery of true class members.  
 
Bayer too has an interest in ensuring it pays only 
legitimate claims. If fraudulent or inaccurate claims 
materially reduce true class members‟ relief, these class 
members could argue the named plaintiff did not adequately 
represent them because he proceeded with the understanding 
that absent members may get less than full relief.
7
 When class 
members are not adequately represented by the named 
plaintiff, they are not bound by the judgment. See Hansberry 
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (explaining that due process 
requires the interests of absent class members to be 
adequately represented for them to be bound by the 
judgment). They could then bring a new action against Bayer 
and, perhaps, apply the principles of issue preclusion to 
                                              
7
 We express no opinion on whether absent class members 
would be successful in arguing they were not adequately 
represented on this ground. 
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prevent Bayer from re-litigating whether it is liable under the 
FDUTPA. Bayer has a substantial interest in ensuring this 
does not happen. Accordingly, we reject Carrera‟s argument 
that the level of proof for ascertainability should be relaxed 
because Bayer‟s ultimate liability will not be based on the 
affidavits.  
 
3. 
Finally, Carrera argues that a screening method such as 
the one described in the Prutsman Declaration will ensure that 
Bayer pays claims based only on reliable affidavits. In his 
declaration, James Prutsman states that he works at Rust 
Consulting, Inc., a firm that has administered class 
settlements for nearly 25 years. A992. He explains that Rust 
“employs numerous methods to detect claims that are 
submitted fraudulently.” A995. “For example, the firm runs 
programmatic audits to identify duplicate claims, outliers, and 
other situations. In addition, Rust has successfully utilized 
fraud prevention techniques where by [sic] the claim form 
offers claim options that do not reflect valid product 
descriptions, prices paid, geographic locations or 
combinations of such factors.” Id. “By providing claims 
options such as a very high pill count or significantly higher 
purchase price in this case, fraudulent claim filers would 
naturally be inclined to select options that they believe would 
increase their claim value. As such, techniques such as these 
can be used to effectively [eliminate] fraudulent claims.” Id. 
 
Bayer maintains the Prutsman Declaration is 
insufficient to satisfy the reliability standard because it only 
addresses methods for allocating payment to a settlement 
class. This fact is important, according to Bayer, because 
19 
 
there are different standards for approving a settlement class 
than for certifying a litigation class, and because Prutsman 
does not opine that his method would satisfy the standard for 
class certification. Bayer also argues that just because some 
defendants have agreed to use such techniques in 
administering a class settlement, it does not mean that it is 
sufficiently reliable. 
 
The Prutsman Declaration does not show the affidavits 
will be reliable.
8
 Nor does it propose a model for screening 
claims that is specific to this case. And even if Prutsman 
produced a model that is specific to this case, we doubt 
whether it could satisfy the ascertainability requirement. At 
this stage in the litigation, the district court will not actually 
see the model in action. Rather, it will just be told how the 
model will operate with the plaintiff‟s assurances it will be 
effective. Such assurances that a party “intends or plans to 
meet the requirements” are insufficient to satisfy Rule 23. 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318; see also Comcast Corp. 
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013) (rejecting 
contention that Rule 23 is satisfied by an assurance that the 
plaintiffs can produce a damages model capable of measuring 
damages caused by a specific theory of antitrust impact). 
Carrera has suggested no way to determine the reliability of 
such a model. For example, even if a model screens out a 
                                              
8
 Based on this conclusion, we do not need to reach Bayer‟s 
argument that the District Court erred by considering the 
Prutsman Declaration, which was produced with Carrera‟s 
reply brief in support of its motion for class certification. 
Accordingly, we will deny Bayer‟s motion to supplement the 
appellate record, which relates solely to this issue. 
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significant number of claims, say 25%, there is probably no 
way to know if the true number of fraudulent or inaccurate 
claims was actually 5% or 50%.
9
  
 
As Marcus was decided after the trial court certified 
the class, Carrera should have another opportunity to satisfy 
the ascertainability requirement. Accordingly, we will afford 
Carrera the opportunity to submit a screening model specific 
to this case and prove how the model will be reliable and how 
it would allow Bayer to challenge the affidavits. Mere 
assurances that a model can screen out unreliable affidavits 
will be insufficient.
10
 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order certifying the class action and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because 
Marcus was decided after the court‟s certification of the class, 
Carrera should be allowed to conduct further, limited 
                                              
9
 Carrera‟s ability to meet the ascertainability requirement 
using a screening model is further in doubt due to his inability 
to clearly remember his purchases of WeightSmart, although 
the District Court did not determine whether his testimony 
was reliable. It would appear that the less reliable a class 
member‟s memory is, the more reliable any screening method 
would have to be. 
 
10
 Bayer also argues that because the statute of limitations 
will bar some claims, the class cannot be ascertained. Because 
the class is defined as all purchasers of WeightSmart in 
Florida, whether an individual‟s claim is barred by the statute 
of limitations is not an aspect of ascertainability in this case.  
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discovery on the issue of ascertainability and afforded another 
opportunity to satisfy the ascertainability requirement.  
